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NO OTHER GODS: 
ANSWERING THE CALL OF FAITH IN THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW 
Howard Lesnickt 
I the Lord am your God 
who brought you out of 
the land of Egypt, 
the house of bondage: 
You shall have no other gods besides Me. 
Exodus 20: 2-3. • 
It is one of the oldest stories around: A few or perhaps a dozen 
centuries ago, a person walking by a group of stone masons in a work 
crew at a half-finished cathedral asked each one in tum, "What are you 
doing?" The first replied, "I'm cutting stone... The second said, "I'm 
earning the money I need to feed my family!' The third answered, "I'm 
building a cathedral." 
If today our passerby were to make a similar inquiry of three 
lawyers entering a courthouse, the answers might be, from the first, "I 
am going to argue a case," and from the second, "I am working-billing 
some time-to feed my family." If the third happened to have been 
influenced by Professor Thomas L. Shaffer, however, his response might 
be a bit more arresting. For over the past fifteen years Shaffer has been 
articulating with increasing clarity his perception that a lawyer is a 
person "called out of the church, sent out from [a] particular people, to 
do something that is religiously important. "1 I propose to inquire what it 
f Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This article grew 
out of an informal talk Jiven at a lawyers' retreat at The Co Ileac of St. Catherine, St. Paul, MN. I 
thank the Sisters of St Joseph of Carondelet for their hospitality. I also thank Milner Ball, Marie 
Failinger, Joan F. Goodman. Thomas L. Shaffer, Amelia Uelmen, Laura Underkuffier, and James 
Boyd White for extremely helpful insights and suggestions along the way. 
• The translation is that of The Rabbinical Assembly, in Etz Hayim: Torah and 
Commentary 442-443 (David L. Lieber et at. eds., 'l1le Rabbinical Assembly 2001). The title 
means "Tree of Life," which is how the Torah is described in the liturgical passage recited at the 
point in the service when the Scroll is returned to the Ark at the rear of the altar. 
I. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Tension between Law in America and the Religious Traditwn, in 
Law and the Ordering of Our Life Together 28,45 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., Wm. B. Eerdmans 
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might mean for us to take this characterization very seriously, to think of 
our taking up legal work as being "called out of" our differing religious 
traditions, and to think of our work as lawyers as "religiously 
important." I want to begin by sharing my understanding of Shaffer's 
own response to this question, as be has worked it out in some dozen 
essays that have richly repaid my recent re-reading.2 I will then venture 
some questions that arise out of this response. 3 
One would not expect lawyers to underestimate the importance of 
their work, but how many of us can say that we regard our work as 
Publg. Co. 1989) [hereinafter Shaffer, Tension]. He spoke specifically there about 
businesspersons, but the thought applies to law practice as well, as Shaffer and others have: 
recognized. 
2. See Tension, supra n. 1; Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, 111e Community of the 
Faithful, in American Lawyers and Their Communitie.J: Etldc& in the Legal Profession 196 (U. 
Notre Dame: Press 1991) {hereinafter Shaffer, Faithful Community]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Review 
Essay: Stephen Carter and Religion in America, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1601 (Spring 1994) 
(hereinafter Shaffer, Stephen Carter]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Human Nature and Moral 
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Relationships, 40 Am. J. Juris. 1 (199S) [hc:reinaftc:r Shaffer, 
Human Nature}; Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethic& in the uw Office, 11 Notre: Dame 
L. Rev. 60S (1996) (hereinafter Shaffer, uw Office]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Maybe a !.Dwyer Can Be 
a Servant; If not . . .  , 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1345 (1996) [hereinafter Shaffer, ServantJ; Thomas 
L. Shaffer, 111e Christian Lawyer-An Oxymoron?, 115 America 12 (Nov. 23, 1996) [hc:rc:inafter 
Shaffer, Oxymoron]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures. Enigmru, and Responsive 
Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 Me. L. Rev. 229 (1999) [hereinafter Shaffer, Towering 
FiguruJ; Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christ/Qn !.Dwyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of 
Justice?, Sl Stan. L. Rev. 903 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Shaffer, Simon]; Thomas L. Shaffer, 
Nuclear Weapons, Lethal Injection, and American OUholics: Faith Confronting American Civil 
Religion, 14 Notre Dame: J. L., Ethics & Pub. Policy 7 (2000) (hereinafter Shaffer, American 
Catholia]; Thomas L. Shaffer, More'& Skill, 9 Widener J. Pub. L. 295 (2000) [hereinafter Shaffer, 
More'& SkillJ; Thomas L. Shaffer, Jews, Christians. Lawyers. and Money, 2S Vt. L. Rev. 451 
(Winter 2001) {hereinafter Shaffer, Money}; Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and JUI'isprudence 
from Within Religious Ctlngregations, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 961 (Apr. 2001) (hereinafter 
Shaff«, Religious CollgregaJioM), 
3. Shaffer's work has inspired an entire generation of lawyers, earning him wide recognition 
as "the: father of the religious lawyering movement." Russell G. Pearce:, Foreword: 111e Religious 
Lawyering Mo11ement: An Emerging Force In Legal Ethic:J and Professionalism, 66 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1075, 1078 (Mar. 1998), and in a very real sense triggering wbat has become a flood of 
personal testimony and legal araumentacion about the relation between a lawyer's faith and his or 
her practice. For recent collections, see Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the 
UIIU of Lawyers and Those 111ey Represent, 26 Fordham Urban LJ. 821 (Apr. 1999); Russell G. 
Pearce, Forwtml: 111e Religious Lawyering Mo��ement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethia and 
Professionalism, 66 Fordham L. Rev. I 075 (Mar. 1998); Faith and rhe Law Symposium, 27 Tex. 
Tech. L. Rev. 911 (1996). See Joseph G. Allegretti, The LD.wyer's Calling: Christian Faith and 
Legal Practice (Paulist Press 1996) [hereinafter Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling); Abbe Smith & 
William Montross, 111e Calling of Criminal Defense SO Mercer L. Rev. 443 (Winter 1999); 
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional 
Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577, I 578-1579 (May 1993) [hereinafter Levinson, Jewish Lmt.yer]. 
Having dedieate4 an earlier work to Shaffer, Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist 
Society, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1469 (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter Lesnick, 111e Rellgious La�rJ, my 
tnbute to him here is to attend in careful detail to the content of what he has been advocating. But 
for the nonns of scholarly writing, I would have entitled this essay, Taldng Tom Shaffer Seriously. 
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religiously important? Let me come at this question by acknowledging a 
need to offer a word on behalf of the second stonemason--or lawyer. 
Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr attributes to the Prophet 
Muhammed the thought (which I believe finds resonance in the Jewish 
and Christian traditions as well) that ''when a man works to feed his 
family he is performing as much an act of worship as if he were 
praying."4 By now, the idea is hardly new that almost any work may be 
a vocation or calling, may have religious importance. 5 The "religious 
connotation"6 of the work is there to be perceived and acted upon, and 
the task of seeing past the inevitable encrustations of work-a-day life is 
perhaps no less challenging for masons than for lawyers. Perhaps it is 
also no less achievable either, at least at times, for a mason building an 
office tower than a cathedral, or for a lawyer drafting an opinion letter in 
a loan application than a brief in a major civil-liberties suit. 
Understanding the religious significance of working to feed one's 
family infuses it with meaning, for it makes of work the beginning of the 
assumption of responsibility for the well-being of another-but only the 
beginning, for the focus is still on material well-being and on those 
"others" closest to the worker. Indeed, this understanding complicates 
the task of deciding how one is to go about one's work, for commitment 
to the material well-being of one's family is a moral hazard as well, with 
the potential for blinding one to the moral significance of the costs that 
decisions made in work (better to "feed one's family'') may impose on 
others. 
By contrast, the third mason, and Shaffer's lawyer, open 
themselves to both the deeper meaning and the lurking greater 
complexity of work. By understanding that its religious significance 
inheres in the manner in which work is carried on and in the radiating 
consequences of its compietion-a cathedrai, a business financing, a 
major civil-liberties decision-the third worker acknowledges 
responsibility for its effects on a community that extends far beyond 
one's family, and may recognize as well that what one's family 
(especially children) needs goes far beyond material sustenance. 7 
In moving toward this broader vision, the question that might first 
come to mind may be termed a substantive one: How does an awareness 
4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam 98 ( 1967). 
5. For a concise discussion of the evolution of the meaning of the words, vocation and 
calling, see Allegretti, The lAwyer's Calling, supra n. 3, at 27-32. 
6. Nasr, supra n. 4, at 98. 
7. Arthur Miller's All My Sons is a classic text illuminating both aspects of this complexity. 
Arthur Miller, All My Sons: A Play in Three Acts (Reynal & Hitchcock 1947). 
462 JOURNAL OF LAW & REUGJON [Vol.XVill 
of religious significance change what we do and don't do in our work? 
One answer to this question is that this awareness sets limits on what we 
will do or decline to do in our professional life. Much of the writing to 
date of the "religious lawyering movement" seeks to illustrate or claim 
legitimacy or respect for such limits. It is advocacy by or on behalf of 
assertedly religious lawyers, addressed to the law itself, making a claim 
on that law as manifested in the governing norms of professional 
responsibility. 8 
Shaffer's deeper, more far-reaching challenge is directed not to the 
law but to religious lawyers themselves. He poses a "procedural" 
question, one that bas the power to reorient our professional lives and 
the role of "professional guidance" within them: Where do we turn for 
. guidance in answering what I have called the substantive question? His 
response: "Called out of the church" as we are to enter the practice of 
law, it is there we return for guidance in carrying it on. 
[T]he lawyer stands in the community of the faithful and looks 
from there at the law . . . . When the study or practice of law 
becomes painful or confusing for her, she returns to the 
community of the faithful, and talks there, in that religious 
community, about her professional life.9 
It is the meaning and significance of this response that I propose to 
examine here.10 
a. 1 have examined the legal question that arises when religiously grounded limits and 
professionally grounded norms dirccdy conflict, in Lesnick, 1M Religious lAwyer, supra n. 3. 
The specifiC context there was the assignment of an attorney, conscientiously opposed to abortion 
on religious grounds, to represent a minor seeking a judicial "bypass .. or parental consent to an 
abortion. 
9. Shaffer, Faithfol CommUIIity, supra n. 2, at 198. 
I 0. It is important to note two observations about the boundaries of this essay. 
First, I focus more on the implications of Shaffer's fundamental stance. looking at the 
profession from within the lawyer's community of faith, than on the merits of an initial decision to 
take that approach. lack Sammons is perhaps the leading proponent of the polar stance, seeking to 
articulate and apply norms that are to be round within the practice of law itself. For the most 
recent and most fully articulated sratement of his view, see lack L. Sammons, "Cheater! .. : 11te 
Cttntral Moral AdmonltiOII of Legal Ethla, Games, Lu.sory Attitudes. Internal PenpectiiiU, and 
Justice, 39 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (2003). It hardly rebuts his position for inc to acknowledge that it 
bespeaks a faith in the moral resources of the legal profession that l no longer can muster. 
Second, it should be borne in mind that the following discussion deals only with the state of 
mind with which a lawyer approaches a client. The action that the lawyer ultimately takes 
depends also on the resulting lawyer-client interaction. For some of Shaffer's thoughts on the 
"moral conversation" between lawyer and client, see Shaffer, Simon, 8Jlflra n. 2; Shaffer, Human 
Nature. supra n. 2. For other thought-provoking discussions of this difficult question, see e.g. 
Robert E. Rodes,lr, Forming an Agenda-Ethics and Legal Etllics, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 977 
(Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Rodes, Agenda]; Amelia 1. Uelmen, Can a Religious Penon Be a Big 
Firm Litigator?, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1069, 1093-1109 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Uelmen, 
Religious Penon]; Robert F. Cochran, lr, Crime, Confession. anti the Counselor-ai-I.Aw: Lessons 
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"Church" is Shaffer's short-hand Christian tenn for this community 
of the faithful, but he does not mean by it his institutional Roman 
Catholic Church, whether his Bishop, pastor or parish. First, he insists, 
"any reservation of the responsibility for moral discermnent to a 
specialist must be challenged, . . . especially if that specialist is 
understood to hold authority partly because he is one of a category of 
persons separated from the life-situations of people making moral 
choices."11 His parish congregation, too, falls short; it "gathers for 
worship on weekends, and once in a while for a picnic or a fish fry. It 
does not gather for moral deliberation."12 It is only in congregations of 
"fundamentalists, Pentecostals, Orthodox Jews, and Anabaptists" that 
the members are likely to be "sufficiently isolated by choice or 
circumstance" for Shaffer to be able to "suppose" that "the worshiping 
community and the deliberating community are routinely the same. "13 
Shaffer has found "church" in a Presbyterian Sunday School class, 
with "the sister and brother Christians with whom I prayed, broke bread, 
cried and argued."14 He has found it among "the circle of believers I 
live and work with, some close by, some who talk to me on the 
telephone or in letters, who take seriously the enterprise of being Jews or 
Christians in the American legal profession. nlS He has found it in "a 
circumstantial group of believers on a university faculty-in 
somebody's office, in the hall, on a walk outside, or at lunch,"16 and 
also, I believe, in the group of faculty and student colleagues with whom 
he practices law in the Notre Dame legal aid clinic.17 
"Believers," it seems evident from his examples, need only be 
people of faith, not necessarily members of a specific congregation or 
even of the same religious tradition. The presence of a religious 
from Dosto;yevsky, 3S Hous. L. Rev. 327, 378-397 (Summer l998j; Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced 
Moral Activism, 8 SL Thomas L. Rev. 9 (Pall 1995). 
11. Shaffer, Religious CongregatioN�, :rupra n. 2, at 976 (quoting the Mennonite scholar John 
Howard Yoder, 77te Priestly Kbtgdom: Social Ethics as Gospe/64 (1984)). Compare Shaffer's 
moving description of the education of Fr. Samuel Ruiz Garcia, former Bishop of San Cristobal, 
by his parishioners: "Bishop R.uiz discovered lhe Church in Chiapu." /d. at 980 (emphasis 
added). 
It is important to note and bear in mind that Shaffer is careful to acknowledge "n=spcx:t for 
teac:�-for what Catholics caU 'the magistcrium' of lhc: church . . . . This respcx:t • . .  has 
nothing to do with papal infallibility; in my view it is best undentood as resembling the rabbinical 
tradition in Judaism." Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at IJS I, n.l 8. 
12. /d. at 13S0-13Sl. See Shaffer, Religious CongregatioN�, supra n. 2, at 968. 
13. Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1352 (emphasis in original). 
14. Shaffer, American Catholics, supra n. 2, at 22. 
15. Shaffer, Faithful Community, supra n. 2, at 199. For his explanation of the oddity oflhe 
use of"cburch" in speaking of Jews, see Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1356. 
16. Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1353. 
17. Shaffer, Law Offtee, supra n. 2,passim, especially at 609-613. 
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congregation is neither sufficient nor necessary to provide a "church" in 
the present context, for Shaffer's church is a gathering of people defined 
not by its ecclesial standing, but by its conception of its task. What is 
required is, and is only, that "questions of priority and behavior are 
resolved in discussion," in a manner that gives the participants warrant 
to believe that the Holy Spirit sat with them and joined in.18 
What are the characteristics of participation in Shaffer's "churchly'' 
processes of ethical discernment? Shaped though they are by the 
particularity of his religious consciousness, the first, and the most 
fundamental, characteristic is one that would apply to virtually any 
religiously based approach: The processes and outcomes of moral 
deliberation, grounded as they are in the sovereignty of God, have 
priority over those of the profession. "[We] talk about the government 
as a problem for faith, rather than faith as a problem for governmene'19 
Shaffer quotes a 19th Century Lithuanian Rabbi-"Israel was created to 
be an illumination unto the nations"-and adds: "Not to learn society' s  
lessons, but t o  teach other lessons to itself and to 'society. "'20 Learning 
professional responsibility, what we all learned and some of us teach, 
moves us (in Sandy Levinson's words) toward "the creati�n, by virtue of 
professional education, of almost purely fungible members of the 
respective professional community."21 To Shaffer, such a practice is 
"[a] pernicious form of corruption," a "familiar complex of pretenses."22 
It is essential to bear in mind what tends to fade into the 
background in Shaffer's discussion, focused as it is on particular 
moments "when the study or practice of law becomes painful or 
confusing:"23 The consciousness of "religious importance" in law 
practice, of being "called out of the Church" to become a lawyer, affects 
one's stance toward lawyers' work in its entirety, not merely one's 
search for ethical discernment in problem sit1.1ations. Indeed, specific 
searches are grounded and oriented by the more fundamental infusion of 
meaning that is enabled by the recognition that, in the words of Shaffer's 
long-time colleague Robert Rodes, "we are all put here to love and 
18. Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1350..135 I, referring to the letter to the Gentiles approved 
by the Council or Jerusalem: "The Holy Spirit and we have agreed • • . .  " Acts 1 S: 28. 
19. Shaffer, American Catholics, supra n. 2, at 10. 
20. /d. at 10-11 (quoting the Netziv of Volzbin from J. David Bleich, Tiklcun Olam: Jewish 
Obligati0113 to Non..Jewish Soc:iely, in Tikkun 0/am: Social Respo113ibilily in Jewish Thought & 
Law 61,9 1  (David Shatz, et. al. eds., 1997)). 
21. Levinson, Jewish Lawyer,supra n. 3, at 1578-1579. 
22. Shaffer, Te113ion, supra n. I, at 49. 
23. Shaffer, Faithfol Community, supra n. 2, at 198. 
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serve."24 The experience of meaninglessness, laying so heavily on many 
lawyers today, is (hopefully) transformed by this reorientation.25 
A second distinguishing characteristic of "churchly'' moral 
discernment is that it is inescapably communal. Shaffer is at his most 
energetically critical of the legal profession when he engages the deep­
seated individualism of our contemporary culture. "Our students," he 
observes, "however sensitive and well meaning, are captives of an ethic 
that leaves each of them ... morally alone; each of them as her own 
moral tyrant; each of them ... a captive of the Enlightenment's 
exaltation of abstract masculine reason."26 Shaffer quotes liberation 
theologian Gustavo Gutierrez: "[T]he following of Jesus always 
supposes membership in the assembly, the ecclesia. The following is 
... a personal, free decision on my part, but I cannot live it out except 
in a community!m "It is not biblically sufficient," Shaffer asserts, "for 
a believer to go off by himself, alone with God, and figure out how his 
faith is to be reconciled with what he works at, or how his faith is to 
inform what he does when he works. "28 
While to some degree the communal quality of religiously 
grounded moral discernment seems inherent in a religious world-view, it 
is an outlook particularly expressive of a Roman Catholic, and perhaps 
also a Jewish, outlook. There are certainly religious traditions in which 
a "believer alone with God," at least when he or she is accompanied by 
Scripture, is not a self-contradiction. More seriously, Shaffer's 
juxtaposition of an insistence on the communal aspect of religiously 
ground moral discernment, with his willingness to admit that shifting 
groups of individuals of diverse religious commitments and affiliations 
can act as "church," gives rise to an important latent difficulty, which I 
24, Rodes, Ag�ndtl. supra n.. ! 0, at 977. The objectJ of Rodes' verbs are, of course, God and 
neighbor. Cf. M. Catbleen Kaveny, Billable Hours in Ordinary Time: A Tlleological Critique of 
tlte lnslrumentalizalion ofTime in Pr ofessional Life, 33 Loyola U. Chi L.J. 173, 184 (Fall 2001) 
[hereinafter Kaveny, Ordinary Time]: "[I]t is a serious mistake for lawyers charging for their 
services to think that they are selling something that is exclusively theirs, despite the fact that they 
are billing their time.'' 
25. This in no way suggests that the transformation is easily broupt into daily awarcmess. 
See Allegretti, /.Qwyu'.r Calling, .rupra n. 3, at 20.21, 32-33; Howard J. Vogel, Th� Terrible Bind 
of the Lawyer in tlte Modem World: The Problem of Hope, the Question of Identity, and the 
Recovery of Meaning in the Practice of Law, 32 Seton Hall. L. Rev. 152 (2001). 
For a stunning suggestion of the possibilities of transformation that a Christian 
consciousness might brin3 to the practice of law, see William Stuntz's speculation on how Jesus 
carried on his trade as a carpenter-what might have been "his motivations and attitudes toward 
his work, the ways he treated his customers and his coworker.'' William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal 
Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707,1721-1722(2003). 
26. Shaffer, Religious Congregations, supra n. 2, at 963-964. 
27. /d. at 965. 
28. Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1353. 
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will address below. 
Shaffer's conception of religiously grounded decisionmaking bas a 
third aspect that, while it is in no way idiosyncratic, is often not linked 
with the emphasis on communal discernment that be insists upon. For, 
to Shaffer, process bas a priority over outcome, and decisionmaking is 
relational rather than hierarcbical.29 Recognition of divine sovereignty 
gives rise to a teaching rather than a governing model. What goes on in 
Shaffer's church is that we "sit down together and think things out;"30 
"what is important to communal discernment, after one assumes the 
presence of God in the discussion, is that everyone be allowed to speak, 
and that everybody else feel bound to pay attention."31 The answers 
given are "not inevitable" and "only provisiona1."32 No "specialist" bas 
authority. 33 It is this principle, I believe, that leads Shaffer to adopt what 
I have termed his fluid concept of"cburcb." 
This lack of emphasis on answers and on the authority of text or 
cleric is uncongenial in contemporary America. Our culture-most 
emphatically including our legal culture-wants always to know which 
side is the "winner" (here, bas the winning moral argument), and the 
"command-and-obey'' approach to religion is ready at band to believers 
and skeptics alike. Yet, Shaffer, while insisting that ethical questions 
are preeminently religious and that religious discernment is 
preeminently communal rather than individualist, rejects authoritarian 
religion and emphasizes a search for ethical discernment that seems 
almost unconcerned with its outcome. This stance, congenial as I find 
it,34 is counter-intuitive for many. 
Shaffer doesn't even say a great deal about what considerations 
should go into the process of ethical discernment-in lawyers' terms, 
29. With Shaffer specifically in mind, Milner Bali quotes Paui Lehmunt�'s asscnion !haL "1he 
environment of decision. not the T'll es of dec:ision, gives to behavior its ethical significance." 
Milner S. Ball, Commentary on the Work of Thomas L. Shaffer: Out of the West Rides an 
Unmasked Stranger . . . , 10 J. L. & Relig. 339, 341 (1993-1994) [hereinafter Ball, Unmasked 
Stranger] (emphasis in original). Ball adds: "Tha.t is why lawyers' ethics is not a matter of 
individual choices but of conununities and origins." /d. 
30. Shaff�, Amerlcsn Catlwlie�. suprs n. 2, at 12. "[T)he way we believers decide whe1h� 
an idea is good or bad" has grealer significance than the answer. /d. at 23. 
31. Shaffer, Simon. supra n. 2, at 917. 
32. ShatTer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1353 n. 25. "Questions" are more significant than "rules 
or principlca." Shaffer, Religio11.11 CongregatioiiS, supra n. 2, at 966. "[W)hatcver would come 
out of moral discernment for believers who are lawyers would not be, as to anyone, coercive." 
Shaffer, Towering Figunts, supra n. 2, at 237. 
33. See supra n. 11. 
34. l have developed at some length my own understanding of the relation between God and 
humanity in Howard Lesnick, Listening for God: Religion and Moral Discernment (Fordham U. 
Press 1998) (hereinafter Lesnick, Listening for God]. This is not the place to rehearse or defend 
my views. 
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what "factors" are "relevant." I have learned much from some two 
decades of involvement in Quaker practice, where the primary route to 
moral discernment is silence.35 So to me his emphasis seems to give 
cognition an appropriate place: After all, with his Sunday School 
classmates he "prayed, broke bread, cried and argued!" More seriously, 
prayer, tears, and table fellowship have without question proven 
themselves sound routes to moral discernment in the experience of 
many, and at bottom I believe that Shaffer's espousal of a process 
orientation is not so much a product of analytical engagement as of his 
experience. 36 
In admitting to his "circle of believers" those of differing faith 
traditions, and emphasizing "discussion" as the primary way to cany on 
moral discernment, Shaffer may appear to discount the importance of 
participating in regular religious practice. To "take seriously" the 
profession of a religious identity may require ongoing participation in 
the practices expressive of that identity. 37 Milner Ball makes the point 
powerfully, in the language of his own tradition: "Exactly how does a 
believer receive community guidance in how faith is realized in work? 
Isn't it by hearing the Word preached and participating in the 
sacraments"?38 Even mere "discussion" is something more-becomes a 
practice-when carried on with the possibilities, and within the 
constraints, of the language of a specific faith tradition. The shared 
belief of a tradition, James Boyd White observes, is "not so much belief 
in the propositions asserted ... , but belief in the value, actuality, 
presence, vitality, and reality of the conversation-belief that this is the 
right way to talk."'9 Shaffer's writings, addressed as they are to readers 
35. For a brief account of my experience in that regard, see id. at 91-92. Quaker silence, it 
hardly need be said, is "not the mere outv."ard silence of the lips," but a challengins active practice 
requiring "a deep quietness of heart and mind, a laying aside of all preoccupation with passing 
things." Caroline Stephen, as quoted in Daniel A. Seeger, Silence: Our Eye on Etemity 8 (Pendle 
Hill Pamphlet No. 318, Dec. 1994). It is, moreover, primarily a communal act, with the Meeting 
an essential participant in an individual's discernment, though no words be exchanged. 
36. Some two decades ago. I ventured to defend a willinaness to admit tears, prayers, and 
even anger in argument, into thinking about legal questions, but on the mther limited ground that 
they in fact played a pan in the lives and minds of the pcophJ who brought "legal questions" to 
lawyers. Howard Lesnick. Legal Education's Concem with Jw:stice: A Conversation with a Critic, 
35 J. Leg. Educ. 414,418 (1985). I did not then acknowledge the role that those nonrational acts 
properly play in the fonnation of our own moral judgments u lawyers. Set! my more recent 
broader recognition in Lesnick, Listening for God. supra n. 34, at 89-90. 
37. "[A] repetitive religious experience ... comes in time to haunt daily life and cast a kind 
of indirect light upon it." Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco 
and Indonesia ItO (Yale U. Press 1968) [hereinafter Geertz,ls/am Observed]. 
38. Pcrsonalllr. liom Milner Ball to Howard Lesnick (Mar. IS, 2002) (on file with Howard 
Lesnick). 
39. Personal ltr. liom James Boyd White to Howard Lesnick (Apr. 1, 2002) (on file with 
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of secular professional journals, can be seen as regarding the ongoing 
religious practice of a person seeking moral guidance as no more than 
background to the concrete search for moral guidance in a discrete 
situation. 
It is important not to hold this concern too tightly. Shaffer's tum to 
a fluid "church" is largely, I believe, a response to his dissatisfaction 
with much of the contemporary religious landscape. In turning to ad 
hoc assemblies of believers drawn from various traditions, he has 
focused on what its members have rather than what they lack, 
recognizing that it may be more salient that a community of moral 
discernment "take[s] seriously the enterprise ofbeing Jews or Christians 
in the American legal profession't40 than that it professes a single faith 
tradition. In actuality, the members of a Shafferian "discerning 
community," even if constituted ad hoc, will often share a faith tradition, 
or find significant commonalities in their (partially) differing traditions. 
In such cases they may tum naturally to specific practices through which 
moral discernment takes on a religious character. What is lost in 
coherence may be offset by the gain in spirit. 
Shaffer's taciturnity about the outcomes and the specifics of the 
processes of religiously grounded moral inquiry should not obscure the 
fact that the inquiry is inherently not neutral. One of his articles, Faith 
Tends to Subvert Legal Order,41 underscores that reality: While lawyers 
and the law itself incline toward "the social, political, and economic 
opinions of those we serve ... the wealthy and powerful,"42 the 
religious community of which he writes, rooted in "[ c ]are for the 
oppressed,'143 is an "alien and unsettled community," "disturbed and 
disturbing," yet "gifted with enduring certainty't44 -a sure prescription 
for subversion! Yet, as is all too well known, religion has functioned as 
much to bolster as to subvert "legal order;,..s and the presence of an 
institutional church is no more sufficient than it is necessary to meet 
Howard Lesnick). 
40. ShatTer, Faitllfol Community, supra n. 2, at 22. 
4 I . Thomas L. Shaffer, Faitlt Tends to Subvert Legal Order. 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1089 (Mar. 
1998). 
42. Shaffer, Religioll3 Congregations, supra n. 2, at 967. 
43. /d. at 979. 
44. The quoted words are the headings of sections of the text; see id. at 970-975. 
4S. Among many examples of the indictment of religion on this ground, see Daniel C. 
Maguire, The Moral Core of Judaism and Christianity: Reclaiming the Revolution (Fortress Press 
1993); Sulak Sivaraksa & Tom Ginsburg, Seeds of Peace: A Buddhist Y'uion for Renewing Society 
(Parallax Press 1992); Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern 
Atheism (W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1993). 
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Shaffer's criteria of a proper locus of moral discemment.46 
It should occasion no sutprise, therefore, to observe that, grounded 
though Shaffer's approach is in his Roman Catholic tradition, it can 
operate subversively against Catholic doctrines themselves. Shaffer 
recounts a telling example from the "advance directives" practice of the 
Notre Dame legal aid clinic. Faculty colleagues had argued "it is 
immoral for our office to prepare documents that might be used to 
disconnect artificially provided food and water from a healthy person.',..7 
The issue bas generated countless articles and conferences. 
Nonetheless: 
Lawyers who read what the judges and the "thinkers" say about it 
. . . and then talk to an elderly widow who is deeply persuaded 
that she does not want "the tubes" inserted in her body when she is 
dying . . . seem to have nothing interesting to talk about . .. 
[We] honor the reluctance of any student ·tawyer who objects to 
preparing [such] documents .... [but] no lawyer has refused to 
prepare the documents; we see almost no indication that any 
lawyer in the office is persuaded by the objections of those who 
question what we are doing.48 
The call of faith is experienced through the concrete reality of a 
student's encounter with the moral dimension of his or her work on 
behalf of a specific person (the client), and that exferience may trump 
the generalizations of a received religious tradition.4 
46. A sympathetic critic has eloquently dc::scri.bcd the problem in these terms: 
[The] attempt to describe the "community of the faithful .. as a body of resident aliens is 
as theologically necessary as it is sociologically suspect. Skeptical, pragmatic, 
suceessful, indiYidualistic, secular America showa up ia church on Sunday morning. 
Lawyers show up, blissfully unaware that they have entered a closed-off, alternative 
polity. 
These facts do not invalidate Shaffer's project. (To the contrary: they make i t more 
urgent!) But they mean he will have a tough time getting a hearing. For his believer­
lawyers will first bave to learn to become the strangers, "minorities," and "Others" that 
Moses' God requires them to be • •• .  {P)ower-holders have difficulty beins outcasts. 
Lc:slio E. Gtrbcr, Can Lawyers B� Saved? The Theological LegQ/ EIIUcs ofThomos Shaffer, 
10 I. L. & Relis. 347,365,366 (1993·1994). 
47. ShatTer, Law Office, su.pra n. 2, at 61 L 
48. /d. at611-612. 
49. Shaffer has elsewhere quoted the tellingly pertinent insight ofHeibert Fingarctto: 
You wrongly treat the virtue of honesty and truthfulness in terms of an abstract principle 
to be understood as a logical universal. This seems to me to be incompatible with the 
spirit of responding to particular human beings, rather than living a moral life conceived 
ultimately in terms of abstract principles. 
Thomas L. Shaffer, .A.merlciUI lA.gaJ Ethics: Text, Retulings, fUid Discu.:rston Topics 17 (Matthew 
Beuder 8r. Co., Inc. 198!1). I am indebted to Milner BaJI, who in personal correspondence bas 
developed this thought with great power and eloquence. 
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Shaffer's emphasis on process should not, however, be misread as 
an invitation to moral lassitude or to easy rationalization of the call of 
self-interest. We are used to what I might tenn a '�urisdictional" 
approach to ethical decisionmaking. Some acts are forbidden, such as 
commingling client funds; some acts are required, for example, 
disclosing client perjury after unsuccessful attempts at remonstrance. 
These are in the zone of law. 50 The middle zone-where we "may" 
rather than "shall" or "shall not"-is outside that zone, and is for the 
most part met with professional silence. A lawyer, according to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, is to be "guided by personal 
conscience and the approbation of professional peers," through the 
"exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment. "51 In one sense, 
this is as it must be, for the Rules are public law, and necessarily do not 
tell us what to do when we are legally free to choose. But lacking 
professional or cultural support for ways of thinking about difficult 
moral issues not subject to mandatory rules, we lawyers are, first, 
inevitably left "morally alone,"52 to decide as we wiU; more deeply, 
however, we find ourselves not at all alone, for we are in the dominating 
company of our clients', our partners •, and our own self-interest, and in 
the grip of a reigning ideology of profession and culture that tells us  that 
to balk at doing what is lega1ly pennissib1e is very likely an imposition 
on one's client. 53 
In their origins, and in some versions of their practice, the religious 
traditions are a deep well of guidance for decisionmaking "beyond the 
rules." Deuteronomy admonishes us in words of obligation: "You must 
do what is right and good,"54 "You shall walk in his ways"; 55 and Jesus 
calls: '•[Flollow me."56 But the idea of "a duty to reach beyond duty"57 
SO. Rulu I.I.S(a) (commingling) & 3.3(a)(3) (2003) (as amended, 2002, but noc yet adopted 
by any Staee) (client petjury}, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2003 ed. (Am. Bar Assoc. 
2002} [hen:inafter A.BA. 2003 MRPCJ. For the earlier version of Rule 3.3(a)(3), see ABA Model 
R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a}(4} & Cmt. 11, in Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, ReguliJiion of 
Lo.wyen: Statutes and Standards 219 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002). 
51. A.BJ. 2(}()3 MRPC, supra n. SO, at "Preamble," paras. 7 & 9. 
Sl. See Shaffer, Religiou.r CongregtlliOM, supra n. 2, at 963-964. 
53. For one carefully reasoned example among dozena of such suggestion&, see Stephen L. 
Pepper, Tile l..a.wyer '1 Amoral Ethical Role: A. Defome, A. Problem, and So!M Possibi/itiu, 1986 
Am. B. Found. Res. I. 613 (1986) [hereinafter Pepper, Amoral Role). 
54. Deut 6: 18. 
55. Deut 28: 9. 
56. Mau 16: 24 (among several other moments). 
57. See Aharon Lichtenstein. Does Jewish Trodition Recognize an Ethic Independent of 
Ha/akha?, in Modem Jewish Etllia 62 (Marvin Foxed., Ohio St. U. Press 1975). Observes Rabbi 
Lichtenstein, we are commanded to "aspire." Jd. at 81. I discuss this idea briefly in Lesnh:k, 
Listening for God, supra n. 34, at 143-144. For an imaginative analysis, from a secular 
perspective, of the question whether there can be a moral obligation to reach beyond moral 
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does not sit well with our mainstream faith communities, which despite 
their origins have been profoundly influenced by an understanding of 
personal autonomy as what Michael McConnell calls "willfulness--the 
ability to do what I want to do, when I want to do it, without being 
judged or constrained," apart from the constraints of positive law." 
(More tradition-oriented faith communities may have a more demanding 
view of religiously grounded constraints, but outside the areas of 
constraint they are no less inclined to treat the choice as simply a matter 
of discretion). For this reason, most of us would likely find, with 
Shaff'er,59 that our faith communities, clerics and laity alike, would 
respond to a request for moral guidance with not much more than 
sympathy at the difficulty of the question and support for whatever we 
might come to decide is the right thing to do. 
Shaffer won't let himself, and his "church," off the hook so easily. 
AB we will see, the sorts of religiously grounded scruples that lead 
Shaffer to find aspects of law practice "painful or confusing''60 are not 
simply the products of the categorical prohibitions expressed in or 
deduced from his religion. Shaffer, I believe,61 would concur with his 
Notre Dame colleague Cathleen Kaveny, who describes religion as: 
best understood not as a set of isolated propositions to be 
understood, accepted or rejected, but as a 'comprehensive 
interpretive scheme[], usually embodied in myths or narratives and 
heavily ritualized, which structure[s] human experience and 
understanding of self and world. '62 
It generates, as Amelia Uelmen felicitously puts . it, not "precise 
maxims"63 but "an internal conviction about the essence of [one's] 
nature as a person and the consequent relationships with God and with 
others," prompting the desire to act out of a "vision of the common 
obligation. see Heidi M. Hurd, Duties Beyond the Call of Duty, 6 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik 
(Annual Review of Law and Ethics) (1998). 
58. See Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Llbemlism, and People of Faith, in 
ChrLft/aJI Perspectlvu on Lqa/ Thought 5, 14 (Michael McCoanc:ll, ct al. cds., Yale U. Press 
2001). Stephen Pepper sees this understanding as a corollary of our prevailing political ethic. 
Pepper, Amoral Role, svpra n. S3. at 616-617. Pot a brief critique of this po$ition, su Howard 
Lesnick, Being a Lawyer: Individual Choice and Resporuibility in the Practice of Law 49�S 1 
(West Publg. Co. 1992). 
S9. See Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1351. 
60. See Shaffer, Faithful Community, supra n. 2, at 198. 
61. I proceed cautiously here. aware that I am attnbuting to Shaffer views expressed by 
others, which I believe are congruent with his. The danger is that I may be influenced by the fact 
that they are congruent with my own. 
62. See Kaveny, Ordinary Time, supra n. 24, at 176, quoting George A. Lindbeek. 
63. See Ue1man, Religious Person, supra n. 10, at 1091. 
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good."64 The aim is to seek to grasp the underlying premises of a faith 
tradition, and to use them analogically rather than deductively. 65 Recent 
scholarship contains several rich examples of this conception.66 
By freeing the processes of communal moral discernment from the 
coercive influences of an authoritarian religion, and perhaps of the 
discerning community itself,67 Shaffer makes it possible to open before 
himself, and lay before us, a more far-reaching set of moral challenges 
than we ordinarily hold still for. Consider first his responses to 
questions within the cognizance of the rules or principles of the 
professional codes:68 
l .  Would it be warranted, religiously, for me to follow 
professional norms that permit or require me to treat "third parties"­
that is, everyone other than my client-as outside the orbit of my care 
and concern, so that: 
-having withdrawn from representing a securities registrant 
fraudulently claiming assets it did not have, I do not disclose the reason 
for my withdrawal to prospective successor counsel?69 
64. /d. at 1079. Jndeed, Uelmen observes, a focus on "highly partkulat" maxims actually 
undcnnines support for relisi.ously-influenced decisionmaking in law practice, for it "could 
portray a caricature of religious lawyers as immature and insensitive, lacking a basic sense of 
moral complexity, and awkward and bumbling in the course of their interactions in a pluralistic 
society." /d. at 1089. 
6!5. For a penetrating discussion of the method of analogy in this context, see Marie A. 
Failinger, The Ju:sttce Who Wouldn 't Be Luthtrtm: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom of Faith 
TraditioiV, 46 Clev. SL L. Rev. 643, 6SS-660 (I 998) [hereinafter Failinger, �tlruan Ju:stlce]. 
66. In Uelme.n, ReligiOWJ PersOif, supra n. 1 0, at 1090-1091,  Amy Uelmen questions the 
tendency of many commentators to pose one-dimensional questions of clashes between 
professional norms and flat prohibitions against participating in specific acts, such as abortions, 
blood tranSfusions, and divorces, neglecting the more far-reaching call of more subtle religious 
nonns. In Kaveny, OrdintJry Time, supra n. 24, at 181-2 1 4, Cathleen Kaveny articulates and 
contrasts the underlying premises of the conception of time prevalent in law practice (and the 
broader capitalist culture} with that of the Roman Catholic tradition, describing with particularity 
the profound influence of that set of implicit premises on lawyers' stance toward their work life. 
In Pailinger, Luthenm Ju:stlce, supra n. 6S, at 665-701 , Marie Failinger tests some of the 
unacknowledged premises of Chief Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence, which she descnbes as "a 
limited role for the judicial use or reason" (666), "a prcf'c:rence for 'order over liberty"' (667), the 
absence of a "moral cridque available . . . to substantiate the propriety of particular legislation" 
(667), and "a thorough lack of rhetorical concern for the neighbor," (693) against some 
fundamental principles of Lutheran theology: law as divine gift rather than divino command, a 
paradoxical affinnation of and deep suspicion of power, and "the premise that neighbor-love is 
responsive to God's love." (693) 
67. For the caveat, see infrtl nn. 82-84 and accompanying text. 
68. Most of the examples that foJlow arose in Shaffer's practice as a legal aid lawyer in the 
Notre Dame Clinic. 
69. Shaffer, Oxymoron, supra n. 2, at 1 2-13. To Shaffer, the "third parties" are not so much 
the lawyer's ''brother and sister" attorneys but the "significant number of investors [who] were 
cheated when the securities were marketed." /d. at 13 .  
For a well-known discussion of a similar question a generation ago, see John M. Ferren, 
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-I agree to draft a will for my elderly client, leaving his 
considerable estate to neighbors who "look out for his welfare," and 
totally (albeit lawfully) disinheriting his two adult children and their 
children?70 
-I agree to draft the papers for a grandmother seeking to adopt the 
infant child of her daughter so that she can qualify for an anned forces 
training program that will not accept her for the program so long as she 
has custody of a child, where the daughter has consented to the adoption 
and neither woman seems interested in pursuing instead available 
temporary shifts in custody?71 
2. Would it be warranted, religiously, for me to follow 
professional norms that require me to subordinate what might be the 
greater justice of my client's needs to the self-justifying premises of a 
deeply flawed political order, so that: 
-I cannot allow a client who bas adequate grounds to have his 
immigration status adjusted, notwithstanding that he has been working 
here illegally, to answer "none" to a question on the application seeking 
the name and address of the applicant's employer?72 
-I cannot give or lend money (except for court costs) to a client?73 
The C01p(Jl'tlle Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. Law. 1253, 1257-1258 (1 978). 
Ferren finds professional nonns to preclude disclosure, a result tbat he criticizes, but on the 
ground tbat it permits using false information to "shop for a lawyer." /d. at 1258. The endangered 
aircraft passengers in his acc:ount (like the defrauded investors in Shaffer's example) are 
apparently off the radar screen. 
70. Shaffer, Human Nature, supra n. 2, at 14. Here, although there is no professional rule 
requirins the lawyer to undertake tbis representation, the coniOW'S of ABA 2003 MRPC Rule 1 .2 
provide multiple rcassuranc:es tbat such a course of action bean no burden of justification. 
71 .  Shaffer, Simon, supra n. 2, at 905-901; Shaffer, Oxymoron, supra n. 2, at 1 7; Shaffer, 
Human Nature, supra n. 2, at 4-9. Sbaft'er's premise here is tbat, should the daughter later want 10 
recover her parental riJhts and the grandmother then resist, local law might make it virtually 
impossible for the daughter to sueceed; his "conscience says to [himJ that God wants children 10 
be with their mothers!' Shaffer, Oxymoron, supra n. 2, at 17. (On Shaffer's understanding of the 
Indiana law, see Shaffer, HuiiiQII Nature. lup1'tJ n. 2, at 7; Shaffer, Simon, supra n. 2, at 90S, supra 
n. 17.) 
Ethical Con.rider11tion 7-8 of the ABA Model Code of Profession41 Respon.ribility, still in 
force in a number of States, famowsly authorizes the lawyer to include morally grounded 
considerations in his or bcr advice 10 the client. It is to remain cleat that the ultimate decision is 
for the client, but attorney withdrawal to avoid carrying out the client's wish is expressly 
permitted. Except for the assertion that the lawyer "should bring to bear . . . the fullneu of his 
experience" in advising the client, there is again no burden of justification imposed for going 
forward without hesitation as the client wishes. 
72. This example was supplied by Bill Simon; see Shaffer, Simon. supra n. 2, at 9 1 1 -912. 
The question is a "trap." Although employment is irrelevant to the merits of the petition, if it is 
disclosed ''the petition is dead at the mailbox." /d. at 91 1. But ABA 1003 MRPC Rule 3.3(a)(1) or 
(34) may prohibit non-disclosure of a client's false statement if the Immigration Service is deemed 
to constitute "a tribunal." Gillen, IUJITO n. SO, at 219. 
73. Shaffer, Religious Congregatlon.r, supra n. 7., at 973. ABA 1003 MRPC Rule 1 .8(e) 
permits institutional defendants routinely 10 use the iaw's delay to force necessitous plaintiffs to 
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-I should not allow an elderly woman, who has been sharing an 
apartment with another woman (whom she helps support but for whom 
she cannot claim a tax deduction) and is offered a rent-free apartment 
over her employer's garage, to exclude the rental value of the apartment 
from her gross income on the ground that she is living there "for the 
convenience of the employer''?74 
In presenting these cases, I understand Shaffer to be making four 
assertions: 
(I) The public norms reflected in the rules or principles in 
question rest on political judgments, that is, contestable conclusions 
about the contours of a just polity. Although law students, and law 
teachers, act at times (especially in first-year, common-law subjects) 
inconsistently with this proposition, I do not regard it as seriously 
debatable. 
(2) The plausibility of those judgments cannot foreclose the 
question whether it is consonant with "God 's will " for a lawyer to apply 
a particular rule to the injury of a specific person or group of persons 
affected by that act. From a religious orientation, one can support this 
proposition without debating the relative merits of act-oriented versus 
rule-oriented approaches to morality. The "proof text" is as fundamental 
as any can be: "You shall have no other gods before me."15 Binding 
one's conscience to the positive law is a manifest act of idolatry. 76 
(3) In each instance there is reason at least to inquire seriously 
whether that consonance is lacking. Shaffer does not argue the merits of 
ac:c:ept inadequate settlements. See the brief, veiled reference to this problem in Charles W. 
Wolfram, Modem Legal Ellrics S09 (West Publg:. Co. 1 986). 
74. Shaffer, Simon, supra n. 2, at 915-916. See Simon's discussion of the issue, in WiJliam 
R Simon, The Praclia of Jwtiu: A. Tlu:ory of LIJwyen' Elhks ! 46-1 47 (Harv. U. Praa !998}. 
The claim is presumably groundless under existing law. AIM 2003 MRPC Rule 3 . 1 ,  probably 
therefore prohibits a lawyer from making or advising a client to make it. Gillers, supra n. SO, at 
21 1 .  Simon would give much. and Shaffer little, moral force to the "statutory puzpose" in 
restricting deductibility, and to the limitations on the ability of the IRS to discover on audit claims 
of deductions not warranted under the law. 
15. Exod 20: 3. 
76. Shaffer has made this point more than once. See e.g. Tension. suprt1 n. l, at 40; Shaffer, 
American CAtholics, supra n. 2, at 1 0.12; Shaffer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1 347- 1 348. See Lesnick, 
Listening for God, supra n. 34, at 149, l SI. 
The great 20• Century Jewish phil050pher Martin Buber put the matter this way: 
The atheist does not know God, but the adherent of a fonn of ethics which ends where 
politics begins bas the temerity [sic] to prescribe to God, (whom he professes to know], 
how far his power may extend . • . .  [W]e do give him up [W)e give up God . , . when 
we profess him in synagogue and deny him when we come together for discussion, when 
we do his commands in our personal life, and set up other norms for the life of the group 
we belong to. 
Martin Buber, And If Not Now, When?, in Israel and the World: Essays In a Time of CrisiJ 234, 
236 (First Syracuse U. Press Ed. 1 93211 997- 1 948). 
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this assertion as to any of the above cases; nor will I. My own belief is 
that, at bottom, one's answer turns on how one understands the biblical 
admonition to love our neighbor, 71 or how one understands our 
responsibility for one another/8 and how one regards the justice of the 
prevailing social order. These are momentous matters, happily not 
directly before me now, and many religious people hear different 
concerns in the voice of God than Shaffer does, or I do. For one who in 
any specific instance finds no serious moral problem following 
professional nonns-one who does not find the matter "painful or 
confusing"79 -there is nothing more to be said. 
( 4) The place to consider the question of lack of consonance is 
among the members of the lawyer 's "church." The call of faith is a call 
to process, carried on in community, without prejudgment or (so far as 
possible) rationalization. "Everyone [is] allowed to speak, and . . .  
everybody else [is] bound to pay attention. "80 In no case is Shaffer 
suggesting that the answer is a quick "yes," that the answer to the 
question is clear. 
The question remains whether the ultimate discernment is left to 
the inquirer or the community. Here Shaffer is implicit at bes� and 
perhaps a bit in the grip of conflicting premises. He is strongly drawn to 
the examples of the Apostolic and Refonnation periods, of which it 
could have been said that "the worshiping community and the 
deliberating community [were] routinely the same,"81 and some of his 
language seems to give the discerning community dispositional 
authority.82 But today such congregations exist only "here and there,"83 
and Shaffer responds to his criticisms of contemporary "mainline" 
77. Lev 19: 1 8. It was a lawyer who "stood up to test Iesus," Luke 10: 25-29, and prompted 
his profoundly challenging teaching on this text, in the Parable of the Good Samaritan. ld. at 30.. 
37. For my understanding of the teaching. .see Lesnick, Listening for God, .supra n. 34, at 1 4 1 -143. 
78. Amy Ue1men, seeins the search for the common good as the fundamental motivating 
force of her work, grounds her understanding of that term in the Second Vatican Council's 
Pastoral Constitution on the Oturch and the Modem World. Gaudium et Spes: "Every group must 
take into account the needs and legilimatc aspirations of every other group, and still more of the 
human family as a whole." Uelmc:n, Religimu Person, supra n. 10, at 1079. "As aucb," she 
infers, "the common good is that which a person reaches only if it includes as a consequence, the 
good of the others." /d. 
79. See Shaffer, Faithful Community, supra n. 2, at 1 98. 
80. See Shaffer, Simon, .supra n. 2, at 9 1 7  and accompanying text. 
8 1 .  See Shaffer, Servt:�nt, .supra n. 2, at 1 352 and accompanying text (emphasis deleted). 
82. Speaking of churches like the "communities of moral discernment" to be found in the 16111 
CenturY, Shaffer describes the community as "competent to decide matters of professional ethics." 
Shaffer, Religious Congregations. supra n. 2, at 979 (emphasis supplied). In such settings, he 
may see the autonomy of the individual as sufficiently embodied in "the fact that the individual 
made a free. adult, continuing choice to be in the congregation." /d. at 978. 
83. /d. at 979. 
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congregations and denominations, not by reading them out of the fold, 
but by turning to more infonnal groups of "believers" assembled ad hoc. 
He may be led as a result to a broader view of the decisional authority of 
an individual within the community, in which the principal task of the 
community is not to act as decisionmaker, but to carry on a process in 
which the discernment of the seeker is guided and facilitated. In any 
event, where it is the seeker who has constituted the "discerning 
community," it is he or she who will charge it, with either a more 
facilitative or a more decisional role. The resulting guidance would be 
no less genuine and significant for its being ultimately less than binding. 
In our present culture, many will find in such an allocation of 
decisional authority too vague and "soft" a resolution, open to 
idiosyncratic variations and self-justifying rationalization. We must 
understand, however, that Shaffer is not proposing a rule or standard to 
be applied post hoc to enable a third party to judge the morality of 
another's actions by probing the other's hidden motivations though 
circumstantial evidence adduced in adversarial proceedings. He is rather 
speaking to the individual facing a morally freighted decision. No one 
but the actor can judge whether he or she has sought honestly to discern 
and conscientiously to follow God's wilJ; perhaps no one at aU can judge 
whether he or she has done so successfully. 84 
The controversy over the viability of a view of religious obligation 
like Shaffer's bas a parallel in the dispute over the wisdom of the 
"legalization" of professional ethics in law. Richard Abel remarked two 
decades ago on the "progressive decline in nonnativity'' of the 
professional standards, symbolized by the move from terming those 
standards "cano�" then a "code," and then "rules" --dealing with" first, 
"ethics," then "responsibility," and finally "conduct;"85 the decline has 
only accelerated in the era of the Model Rules. To many lawyers today, 
the notion of a self-imposed obligation is simply an oxymoron; the 
source of an obligation is definitionally outside the obligor. 86 
84. l am reminded of the practice of a youns man f met, a Westc:rncr who bad convened to 
Islam and was often asked, because of the way he dn:ssed, whether he wu a Muslim. He 
sometimes II'IIWcred, "l don't know," and responded to the perplexed reaction this engendered by 
saying, "Mruli.m is an Arabic word meaning one who has sum:ndercd to the will of God. Only 
God knows whether I am Muslim. I can only say I tty." 
85. Richard L. Abel, Jn!y Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 
686 n. 257. 
86. Georse Cooper has brilliantly portrayed the competins oullooks in his fictional attorneys, 
Senior and Younser, as they enpse one another's fimdamentally differing approaches to 
"aggressive lax plannins,'' the mcanins of ethical practice and the idea of seJf.imposed 
obliptions, indeed, the meaning and purpose of practicing law. George Cooper, 17re AliO,'dance 
Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethia, and Tax Reform, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1 553, 1577-
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In standing against that tide, Shaffer speaks from a religious 
perspective. But the conflict exists within both religious and secular 
perspectives (even within the same religious tradition), not between 
them. To many religious people, Shaffer is simply wrong about the 
means of discerning the Divine Will-to them, the decisions, general or 
case-specific, of authoritative interpreters of Scriptural and other 
admonitions of a particular tradition, are the voice of God-while to 
many others only a narrower position is tenable. 87 This is not the place 
to debate the question.'8 Suffice it to note that negative characterizations 
of Shaffer's approach as too subjective or pennissive often reflect 
unspoken disagreement at a far more fundamental level. 
1596 (Dec. 1980). See the discussion in Lesnick, Being a lAwyer, supra n. 58, at 206-209. 
87. I n:call hearing Roman Catholic natural-law philosopher Robert George, addressing a 
largely Catholic audience, advance u the dispositive criterion of moral judgment the simple 
question, "What does Jesus say?" To a q11estioner who objected that the Gospels are simply silent 
on many contemporary moral questions, George replied, "Jesus speaks through the Magisterium." 
Were one to have countered, "Who says so?," he would presumably have responded that Jesus 
himself did, in naming Peter u the keeper of the keys of the Kingdom, Matt 16: 1 9; cf. id. 1 8: 1 8, 
read by the editors of The New Oxford Annotated Bible u establishing that "[t]he authority to 
interpret Jesus' teaebing extends to the community's judicial decisions." The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible 3Sn (New Testament pagination) (Michael D. Coogan, ed., 3d ed. 2001 ). 
Compare what seems to me the far nanowcr view of another esteemed Roman Catholic 
scholar, Robert Rodes: 
[M]any faith traditions recognize some privileged source of religious discernment within 
their foundation documents, the community of their belicvcn, or the polity of their 
church. But only a few such traditions claim a broad sweep of privileged moral 
discernment. In my own tradition, Roman Catholicism. the higher echelons of the polity 
claim privileged discernment of a few principles of aencral morality that Catholic: 
lawyers have to take into account in their practice. Some faith traditions go farther, but 
most do not go even as far. 
Rodes, Agenda, supra n. JO, at 979. 
A more f\mdamental divergence from George's view is expressed by Michael Perry, also 
writing out of the Roman Catholic tradition. To Perry (speaking through a hypothetical person, 
Sarah): 
For Sarah, for whom God is love. not supreme legislator, some things are good for 115 to 
do or refrain from doing not because God commands them, but bccallSe God is what 
(who) God is, because the universe . . .  is what it is, and, in particular, because we 
human beings arc wbo we are. 
Michael J. Perry, Whta u "Morality " Anyway?, 45 Viii. L. Rev. 69, 71 (2000). 
88. My teacher, Rabbi Marcia Prager, has eloquently articulated a religious consciousness 
that denies the necessity of dichotomizing external and internal sources of obligation: 
The Uving God speaks to each of us fi'om the inside out, in our own voice. For my soul 
to recognize God's voice there mllSt be an inner voice l hear, an imperative in the depths 
of my soul. The word "commandment" casts God's voice as if it were only a voice of 
external authority, but our teachcn know that when we truly hear, we hear an inner voice 
and touch an inner knowing u welt" 
Marcia Prager, The Path of Bles3ing: Experiencing the Energy and Abundance of the Divine J 56-
J 57 (BelJ Tower 1998). Listening for God is my attempt, congruent with this thought, to present a 
view of religion u "an expression not of a command but of a truth." Lesnick, Li3tening for God, 
3upril n. 34, at 1 1 3  (emphasis deleted). In its final chapter, l suggest a parallel way of looking at 
legal obligation. /d. at 1 32-160. 
478 JOURNAL OF LA W  & RELIGION [Vol. XVm 
In recent years, perhaps as a result of his direct work with poor 
people in the legal aid clinic, Shaffer has ratcheted matters up 
significantly. Going beyond specific acts of attorney blindness to his or 
her participation in immoral acts, he has powerfully broadened the 
challenge: 
[M]oney is the number-one most serious moral problem for 
American lawyers and their clients . . . . The Rabbis teach that 
• . .  God is the Creator of prosperity. One who ignores the 
obligation to the poor is an idolator who does not recognize the 
source of wealth. 
The Book of Leviticus . . . says, "You shall not put a stumbling 
block in the path of the blind." The sages of Judaism decided that 
the rule does not apply to those who harass blind people as much 
as it applies to those who misuse the law, who are dishonest, but 
legal, who, "through perfectly legal transactions," mistreat 
wlnerable people-my debtor clients . . . .  The Rabbis [also] say 
that those who use the law to protect their wealth are like those 
who buy from thieves . . . .  89 
"Convicted" as he is by this challenge, Shaffer begins by 
questioning pervasive rather than particularized choices we make in the 
practice of law: the fondness of lawyers for work specializing in service 
to wealth, the failure of those lawyers who "are able to raise moral 
standards in business" to make serious efforts to do so, and the pervasive 
neglect by most lawyers of the ordinary legal needs of ordinary people.90 
But he cannot rest easy there. His self-described ''tirade't91 goes on to 
question lawyers' relative wealth itself. Moreover, he does not speak 
only oflarge-finn partners and senior in-house lawyers.92 He challenges 
himself, and most of us, as well� 
I do not worry about affording a vacation, or going to the dentist or 
the movies. I do not worry about a comfortable house, or new 
clothes . . .  , or about safe living conditions. So, who is self­
deceived about wealth? Not just those in S 11  million condos. 
Maybe what I need is a more truthful religious solution to my own 
89. Shaffer, Money, :�upra n. 2, at 460. On my hypotheaiJ as to a contributing cause of thii 
stance, see the account of his experience in Law Office, and lrls own reflection: 
Some of us [tea�:hers and students] have moved radically to the left-perhaps in the way 
that Latin American liberation tbeologiam hav�as we [have] become involved in the 
lives of people from the American unden:lass whom we come to know, and as our 
clients show us what courage is. 
Shaffer, Law Office. supra n. 2, at 610. 
90. Shaffer, Money, 8upra n. 2, at 459, 4S4. 
9 1 .  /d. at 458. 
92. See id. at 45 1 n. 4. 
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situation, not so much in tenns of theory and command as in 
particular answers being lived out by particular people.93 
479 
He finds sobering salience in the stories of ordinary people striving 
consciously to limit their income and spending, and in the admonitions 
of the Jewish tradition and its "extensive rabbinic limits-against 
hoarding [and] temptations to corruption, . . .  [its] positive injunctions to 
generosity, to philanthropy, to spending time with family and in 
religious study, and to social responsibility.94 
Despite the depth of Shaffer's challenge, recall that he asks people 
of faith only to listen, to be in his company as he listens to the call of his 
faith, and then to listen,faithfully, for that of their own. Nonetheless, he 
has no illusions about the reception his ideas would receive: Serious 
discussion of them among most Christian and Jewish congregations 
would, he suggests, be deemed "impertinent and intrusive."95 As I have 
tried to listen to Shaffer, advertant to what it might mean for me to act 
on a consciousness of my work as "religiously important," I have found 
him about as intrusive and impertinent as their hearers might have found 
Moses, Amos, Isaiah, or Jesus. I can neither dismiss nor follow his call. 
What I can do is, first, acknowledge my abiding gratitude and 
admiration for his courage in raising with us these unwelcome questions; 
second, deflect (perhaps only for the moment) that part which most 
profoundly draws in question the way I live; and, third, raise a set of 
reservations about some radiations of his approach to moral 
discernment. 96 
I understand Shaffer to be speaking primarily to people who think 
of themselves as living their lives within a faith tradition, but have 
allowed themselves to forget that it is inherent in religion that its moral 
claims are prior to those of "the world"-" You shall have no other gods 
bestdes me "-and should not so easily be accommodated to the values 
of the prevailing social order. Again, this priority is not a result of any 
argument or rational calculus; to a believer, it is simply a fact about the 
way the world is put together.97 C.S. Lewis put it well: "God is to be 
93. ld. at 465. 
94. /d. at 468. For a similar theme, drawing heavily on the writing of Christian theologian 
Sondra Ely Wheeler, see Sbaffer, Religiou.s CongregatioiiJ, supra n. 2, at 965-967. 
95. !d. at 967. 
96. In this, I can claim only a fragment of lhe wisdom of Milner Ball. Speaking of Shaffer's 
words as "prophetic"-"gent!e but not lhc: less powerful and prophetie"-be responds: "The 
appropriate response to prophc:cy is to rc:ceive and act upon it, not to make it the subject of law 
journal commentary. Accordingly, I offer a personal report rather than scholarly criticism." Ball, 
Unmasked Stranger, supra n. 19, at 344. 
97. Cf. Michael Perry, supra n. 87; Amy Uelman. in Uelmcn, Religious Person, supra n. 10, 
at 1079 ("Religious reflection brings me to a sense of obligation-not because of an external 
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obeyed because of what He is in Himself. If you ask why we should 
obey God, in the last resort the answer is, 'I am. "'98 
I don't think that Shaffer is admonishing religious skeptics that 
they should become believers, or even suggesting that they would be 
better people if they did. Yet, to both "convinced skeptics, and those of 
us in that borderland between faith and doubt-and here I include 
myselt'9-it is difficult not to think of the matter as one of the balance of 
advantage, whether as shallowly as "Pascal's Wager, or in some other: 
version.100 And so, reading a believer's comparison of ethical 
discernment from within a community of faith with that from outside it, 
it is easy to think of the believer as asserting some moral superiority of 
embracing a faith tradition. 
Unlike many religionists whose triumphalist "testifying, makes 
such an imputation appropriate,101 I do not place Shaffer in that group.101 
Nonetheless, in some ways Shaffer is hard for a religious skeptic or 
"fence·straddler" to read. Even if he is not telling us to mend our erring 
command, but rather out of an internal conviction about the essence of my nature as a person and 
tho consequent relationships with God and with others"). To Shaffer, "tho religious tradition . . . 
has not understood itsolf as a philosophy or a preference or a point of view. It bas understood 
itself as a sequence of facts that those in tbo tradition learn to remember." See Shaffer, Tension, 
supra n. 1 ,  at 28. 
98. C.S. Lewis, Surprised by Jqy: The Shope of My Early Lifo 231 (Harcourt, Brace, & 
World, IrK:. 19SS). , 
99. I have set out my own beliefs and doubts in Lesnick, Listening for God, supra n. 34, at 
25-43. 
1 00. The entry on Blaise Pascal in The Encyclopedia of Religion vol. 1 1 ,  201 ,  203 (Mircea 
Eliade & Owles J. Adams eds., Macmillan 1987) describes his famous .. wager" as "a way to 
persuade a skeptic that he ought to bet on God, however uncertain of God's existence he might be; 
it is . . •  [not] another 'proof of a tbeological trulb. It is practical advice . . . .  :'' You have much 
to pin if your "bet on God" turns 0t.1t to be risJtt, and much to Jose if your bet against God turns 
out to be wrong. 
10 1 .  For an especially noxious example, see (if you must) the tcstifyina of Justice Scalia, 
preening himself on bis assertedly superior insight into tbe Roman tradition and the consonance of 
lbe dealb penalty wilb Christian morality. Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, 123 First 
Things: l. Religion & Pub. Life 17 (May 2002). (available at bttp;//www.firstthings. 
com/ftissueslf\0205/articles/sca]ia.btm}). 
1 02. Shaffer has had critical things to say about what he and others term "American civil 
religion," into which molt contemporary religious bodies have fit themselves, and which enables 
many to live comfortably in a religious community and forgot or disregard tbe priority of religious 
claims. However, I believe lbat his complaint is that they do not live by their own professions. 
(Among the works cited in supra n. 2, 0x.ytMro11 has a very brief summary statement of this idea, 
id. at 1 3-14). 
Ho also speaks critically of the norms of the legal profession, but it would be a mistake to 
read him as if he were calling for the Rules-drafters, Congress, or the Suprc:mc Court to 
accommodate those norms to "the call of faith." (I have made a secularly-grounded claim along 
lbose lines, in Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer. supra n. 3,  at 1 469-1 493.). He is rather saying how 
believing lawyers should respond to the "tension" between their beliefs and professional rules and 
norms; the problem is what the church should do about the government. not what the government 
should do about the church. Shaffer, AmerictJII Calholics, supra n. 2, at 10. 
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ways, his words seem to characterize those of us not in the "circle of 
believers"103 as living a relatively impoverished moral life: We are 
"captives of an ethic that leaves each of [us] . . .  morally alone"; we are 
each our own "moral tyrant";104 secular moral thinking, whether 
grounded in law, reason or experience, "lacks a depth that the religious 
tradition is able to remember''-the "call to tragedy."105 So perhaps it is 
defensiveness on my part to suggest, as I now will do, that he too 
sharply dichotomizes communal and individual discernment, and too 
narrowly cabins the depth and power of secular rationality as a ground 
of moral discernment. 
Shaffer has written recently of prophets, mentors and role models, 
and invoked, most eloquently, some favorite ones, ancient (Isaiah) and 
modem (Sr. Joan Chittister).106 I can anchor my objection by recalling 
one who most assuredly deserves a place among their company, one, 
indeed, who stands with Moses and Jesus as our three greatest moral 
teachers. For Socrates in many ways personified rationalist 
individualism. When one of his interlocutors sought to justify laughing 
"instead of refuting" him by noting that he had "put forth views nobody 
would accept," Socrates responded: 
[T]ry the kind of refutation I think is called for. For I . . .  produce 
one witness to whatever rm saying, and that's the man I'm having 
a discussion with . . . . See if you'll be willing to give me a 
refutation, then, by answering the questions you're asked. 
It's you alone whom I call on for a vote . . . .  107 
There is a "community'' of sorts here, but hardly Shafferian-not 
only because of its strict limitation of size, but more fundamentally 
becalise of the individualism inherent in the relentlessly rational 
character of the "dialogue." "I am the kind of man," he tells his friend 
Crito, "who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to 
me,"108 even when what is at stake is his refusal to allow his own life to 
be saved: 
103. See Shaffer, Faitllfol CommiUiil)', 8Upl'a n. 2, at 199. 
104. See Shaffer, Religious Congregations, supra n. 2, at 963. 
105. See Shaffer. Tension. supi'(J n. 1. at 47. 
I 06. Thomas L. Shaffer, Tile Biblical Prophell as Lawyers for the Poor, Address on Legal 
Ethics, Religious Values and Poverty LIJw, given at Fordham University School of Law, 
Conference on Religious Values and Poverty Law: Clients, Lawyers & Conununities, Jan. 3 1 ,  
2003 (copy on file with the author). 
107. Gorgias •474a-b, 476a in Plato Complete Works 791, 817-8 18, 820 (John M. Cooper ed., 
Donald J. Zey1 trans •• Hackett Publg. Co., Inc. 1997). 
108. /d. at Crito •46b, 37, 41  (G.M.A. Grube trans.). 
482 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XVIII 
[W]e must examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out 
of here when the Athenians have not acquitted me. If it is seen to 
be just, we wiii try to do so; if it is not, we will abandon the idea 
. . . . If it appears that we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no 
need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we 
stay here and keep quiet . . .  rather than do wrong.1�» 
And die he did, taking the cup into his own hand-to those around 
him "a man who, we would say, was of all those we have known the 
best, and also the wisest and the most upright,"110 and to us an enduring 
example of the capacity of reason alone to guide us, not only in 
discerning the "just," but in resisting the most powerful temptation not 
to act on that discernment: 
[A]mong so many arguments this one alone survives refutation 
and remains steady: that doing what's unjust is more to be guarded 
against than suffering it, and that it's not seeming to be good but 
being good that a man should take care of more than anything, 
both in his public and his private life. 1 1  1 
It is true that Socrates' example is enduring in part because of its 
rarity. But how many true followers of Jesus do any of us know? Yet it 
does seem to be the case that rationality does not serve a person in moral 
doubt as well as religious faith, 1 12 not on some empirical ground­
counting up exemplars and backsliders--but because of differences 
inherent in the two modes of response to morally freighted choice in life.  
109. /d. at *48c:, d. 43. 
1 1 0. /d. at Go'llitls •S216, 869. 
I l l .  Gorgltu, ��.�pra n. 107, at •S27b, 869 (emphasis in original). 
1 1 2. Socrates• commi1ment 1o aetins on his rationally arrived-at discemments. was explicitly 
grounded in his religion. "It is impossible," be told his jurors at the "sentencing" phase of his trial, 
"for ITif: to keep quiet becallSC that mea115 disobcyin& the god." /d. at Apology *38, 17, 33 
(G.M.A. Grube trans.). If to us that rings less powerfully than (for example) Martin Luther's 
declaration to the Diet of Wonns, "Here stand I; I can do no otber" in (Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations 432 (Angela Partington cd., 4rh cd., Oxford U. Press 1992)), it may be so partly 
because Socrates• "god" seems so foreign to us, and partly because we have learned to be rather 
cynical about the distinction between rationality and rationalization. Most fundamentally, 
however, I believe the reason is that to Socrates rational QiSQQ\It$e s� tQ have been the only 
route to disc:emmcnt of tbe Divine will. Charles Kahn describes the Platonic conviction that: "the 
UJISeat, intangible world, ac:ceutble only to rational thought and intellectual understtuuling, is 
vastly more meaningfUl, more precious, and more real tban anything we can encounter in the 
realm of ordinary experience." Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socrolk DI4Wgw,· The 
Philosophical Use of a Litersry Form 66 (Cambridge U. Press 1996) (emphasis supplied). See 
James Adam, The Religious Teachers of Greece 337 (Ref. Book Publishers, Inc:. 1965): "On 
questions of morality and conduct . . .  [o]ur business is to determine [tbem] by the exercise of 
reason, and reason alone." (On the complexity of Socrates' thought, see id. at 320 et seq; Roslyn 
Weiss, Socrates Dissalisjied: An Analysis of Plato 's Crilo 15·19 (Oxford U. Press 1 998)). In our 
religious traditions, the route to "tile god" is inescapably (although not entirely) noncognitive. See 
Lesnick, Listening for God. supra n. 34, at 89·101.  
458] NO OTHER GODS 483 
The "air" of reason tends toward the rarified, that of faith toward the 
saturated. Either may suffocate, but it seems inherently more difficult to 
enrich the former than to ameliorate the effects of the latter.1 13 
Nonetheless, at least some of those to whom Athens speaks in ways that 
Jerusalem does not deserve a bit of encouragement, which Shaffer's 
words hardly supply. 
Moreover, Shaffer's own fluid notion of the community of 
"church" counsels recognition that discerning communities may be 
found outside the religious tradition.114 My good friend, Carrie Menkel­
Meadow, has written wisely as well as movingly about her own 
odyssey, 1 15 where first from her parents '  experience in the Third Reich, 
and then from her own in America during the 1960s, she learned that 
"religious birthrights can be replaced by formative experiences . . .  that 
challenge, as well as reinforce, that into which we are born," and that 
"religious sources of values [can be] trumped by political 
commitments."116 In her life, those commitments ''were informed by a 
respect both for individualism and a communalism that sought to be far 
more inclusive than traditional family, religious, or nation·state 
f<?rmations," and have been "as stron� as any of the traditional pulls of 
religious or family-inspired morality." 17 
For Menkel-Meadow, "different kinds of sacred places and 
celebrations . . .  [and] new kinship and loyalties"1 18 have supplied both 
the community and the "source[s] of spiritual and moral values"1 19 that 
Shaflfer has sometimes found in his "church." After all, if l can come to 
accept, as I have, .. church" as a fitting description of Jewish 
communities of moral discernment, JlO perhaps Shaffer should 
acknowledge coordinate status for the kind of quasi-secular communities 
1 13. Marie Pailinpr bas written profoundly about the possibilities and limitation� of 
professional and religious "communities of memory" in preserving what she terms "fidelity" to 
moral obligations. Marie A. Failinpr, Is Tom Shaffer a Covenantal Lawyer?, 77 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 705, 767-784 (2002) [hereinafter Pailinger, Covenantal �er]. 
1 14. In other writing. Shaffer docs celebrate the moral disc:crnment supplied to lawyers by the 
etlmic: communities from which they have c:ome. See e.r. Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, 
American Lawyers and Their Communiliu: Ethics in the Legal Profession (U. Notre Dame Press 
1 991). Wbils thoss ethnic: sroups were eharac:teristieally religiously strons, their etlmic:ity may 
have been prior in generating the grounding to which ShatTer points. I owe my recognition of this 
point to Milner Ball. 
l iS. Curit: Mcnkel-Meadow, .4nd Now a Won/ About Sec:u/ar HWIUUiism, Spirilualily. and the 
Practice of Justice and Coriflict Resolution, 28 Fordham Urban L.J. 1073 (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter 
Menkcl-Meadow • Now a Word]. 
1 1 6. Id. at 1076. 
1 1 7. Id. at 1077. 
1 18. Id. at 1078. 
1 1 9. /d. at 1079. 
120. See ShatTer, Servant, supra n. 2, at 1 350 n. 16. 
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of which Menk:el-Meadow, and many others, have "testified."121 Such 
communities do not require their members to "assumeD the presence of 
God in the discussion,"122 but I wonder whether, having accepted as 
"church" rather casual, ad hoc collections of persons of widely varying 
religious outlooks, Shaffer can continue to insist so strongly on this 
requisite. Of course, one can simply regard the assumption of Divine 
presence as definitional, but the question remains whether such a 
definition bas real salience. In another context, he states the "essentials" 
for membership in the "people of God.
, 
as "communal quality of belief; 
local group as the place for moral discourse; respect for teachers."1n 
This admirable catalogue applies as well to at least some communities 
that would not dream of seeking to be accounted "people of God."124 
The problem could be resolved by narrowing rather than 
broadening the concept of "church," to reject Shaffer' s  acceptance of 
non-congregational communities of moral discernment. I have referred 
above to Milner Ball's  pertinent observation125 that the lawyer coming to 
his or her community of faith for moral guidance does so profoundly 
oriented by a prior and ongoing engagement with the practices of that 
community's faith tradition. Shaffer would surely accept the salience of 
that insight. In coming nonetheless to find genuine "church" among ad 
hoc groupings of "believers" who differ in the nature and even the 
existence of their religious affiliations, be is probably led by his acute 
awareness of the moral failings in the triumphalism of conservative, and 
the accommodationism of liberal, congregations. 
As my speaking of the "quasi-secular'' suggests, I believe that the 
boundary between the religious and the secular is somewhat more 
121 .  Menkel-Meadow speaks especially of"women's consciousness raising groups," but much 
more broadly of "alternative institution�" such u "communes. group bomes. pan.icipatory 
networks, labor alliances, new rclationshipJ, and political organizations," insisting that "there was 
moral teaching in these movements." Mcnkel-Meadow, Now a Word. supra n. 1 1 4, at 1071-1078. 
1 22. See Shaffer, Simon. supra n. 2, at 917. 
1 23. Shaffer, Serwmt. supra n. 2, at 13SO n. 16. 
124. Shaffer may well aarce that its "communal quality" is more salient than the specifics of 
its "belief." "All that ["church'1 can mean, by way of definition, is 'people of God', and only 
God knows wbo God's people are." Personal correspondence from Thomas L. Shaffer to Howard 
Lesnick (f.:opy on file with the author). 
Cathleen Kaveny understands Catholic thinkins to use the term, "church," to refer .. to all 
thoso. of whatever faith, who live in accord with divine will," explif.:itly includina Jews and 
Moslems. Kaveny, Ordinary Time, supm n. 24, at 209 n. 97. Whether she, or the Roman 
tradition, means to includes non-believers is not clear from her language or quotations. Martin 
Buber, in discussing what many today would regard as self-evidently an oxymoron, religious 
socialism, wrote: "[S)ocialism without religion docs not hear the divine address, it does not aim at 
a response, yet still it happens that it responds." The Way of Respome: Martin Buber-Selectiom 
from his Writings IS8 (Nahum N. Glatzer cd., &hocken Books 1 966). 
125. Ball, Unmasked Stranger, supm n. 29, at 341 . 
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porous than Shaffer's language implies. To me, the core of the religious 
experience is the encounter with transcendence, the experience of awe in 
the presence of the infinite, which grounds a palpable sense of wonder, 
an openness to mystery.126 A secular morality typically abides not in 
wonder but in doubt, viewing mystery as a limitation to be overcome, if 
possible, by philosophical and scientific inquiry. The sense of 
"tragedy," which Shaffer notes as a special aspect of the moral 
equipment of religious people, 127 is kept at bay in much secular 
thinking.'28 To a substantial extent, then, Shaffer has good grounds for 
speaking as he has. 
But there is nothing inherent in secularism, in particular in the 
rejection of theistic approaches, that requires the reduction of wonder to 
clarity. A secular consciousness that hospitably incorporates a sense of 
awe and wonder has much in common with a similarly oriented religious 
consciousness. 129 
Beyond that, individuals have a complexity that resists neat 
classification. Philosopher-classicist (now law professor) Martha 
Nussbaum may provide an example. She speaks of "reverence and awe" 
for the nonns of the moral law as means of committing ourselves to 
them, as means of deeming them obligations: "We picture them as if 
they stood outside of us, even though in a sense we are well aware that 
they stand within us."130 She is moved by Immanuel Kant' s description 
of the "ever-increasing awe" with which he experiences "the starry sky 
above me and the moral law within me." It is not that the moral law "is 
external;" she reads Kant to deny that explicitly. Rather, "he regards its 
presence in himself with the same awe with which he views the 
heavens." To Nussbaum, by language of transcendence we "express our 
wish to be bound" by the moral law, "even when we wish to do 
otherwise."131 We need not determine whether she belongs to a faith 
community to appreciate the capacity of her moral discernments to 
ground decisionmaking. 
126. See Lesnick. Listening for God, supra n. 34, at 66-69; Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer, 
supiYl n. 3, at 1 500- 1 50 1 .  
1 27. See Shaffer, Tension, supra n. 1, at 47. 
128. See the quotations ftom the work of Sandra Schneiders, Cornel West, & Richard 
Rubenstein in Lesnick. Th• Jaligimu Lawyer, supra n. 3, at 1500 n. 135. 
129. See the brief discussion in Lesnick, Listening for God, supiYl n. 34, at 67·68, from which 
the two preceding sentences in the text are taken. 
130. Martha C. Nussbaum, Jlaluing Jlalues: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 1 97, 212 (Summer 1 994) (emphasis supplied). 
131 .  /d. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz understands this grounding of a sense of obligation as 
a primary function of "the religious experience" of ritual. Gcertz, Is/tun Observed. supra n. 37, at 
1 10. 
486 JOURNAL OF LA W  & REUGION [Vol. XVIII 
More fundamentally, the ''wish to be bound" is exactly the sort of 
self-imposed obligation that characterizes a non-authoritarian religious 
consciousness like Shaffer's. Just as he can, I believe, hold his own 
against dismissive characterizations of his approach by religious 
traditionalists as soft and permissive, so should at least some "quasi­
secular'' communities of moral discernment be able to claim a place of 
equivalent respect at his tab1e.132 
Nonetheless, equivalent respect may require something short of 
table fellowship, and my reservations may support Shaffer's thoughts 
more than they undermine them. I only suggest, perhaps because of the 
tentative and limited quality of my own religious· commitments, that a 
gentler characterization of the moral world of those who cannot find a 
home in the religious tradition is appropriate. The "circle of believers" 
of which he writes133 should not too vigorously police its boundaries.134 
1 32. Sara Cobb, Director of tbe Harvard Project on Negotiation, has written insightfully (and 
movingly) of moments in the course of a mediation session wbell "something happens in the 
room, something that is more important ihan the agreement tbat is emerging, tbat tbc conflict is 
itself just a vehicle for the creation of something sacred, sornclhing whole, something holy." Sara 
Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Resolution Practice, 28 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1 0 1 7, 1 0 1 7  (Apr. 200 1 ). Her article effectively combines experience and 
analysis 10 describe an approach that is neither religious nor secular. 
1 33. Shaffer, Fallltful ComlrRmUy, supra n. 2, at 199. 
1 34. Marie Failinger, descn'bing several fonns of religious witness, characterizes tbem as 
relying on no fon:c save the force of the story they tell. Yet, she notes, "for some who will not sec 
or hear, the story still feels like force, because it demands tbem to consider the possibility that they 
have rumcd their eyes and ears away from the trutb. But," she goes on: 
understanding the response . . .  also reminds the . • .  storyteller that he does not need to 
usc worldly fonns of forco-rules and sanctions, physical force, or social pressure-on 
his fellow non-bclievina lawyers . . • . [T]o be storytellers is ultimately to Jet go of 
[one's] own security . . .  , to trust that the story is powerful enough to transform without 
the need for worldly fonns of power. 
Failinger, CoveiUllltal Lawyer, supra n. 1 1 2, at 792. Tom Shaffer, she concludes, embodies this 
form of witness. See /d. at 792-793. 
